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he Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) first engaged in the stockpile management of conventional ammunition in 2013 and has since developed in-house technical, operational, and strategic capabilities for ammunition through-life management. The GICHD
is an active supporter of the ammunition management community of practice, and has authored and
contributed to articles on this topic, including raising awareness of ammunition safety and security concepts.1 The GICHD also collaborates with the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery (CISR)
at James Madison University by jointly managing the Collaborative Ordnance Database Repository
(CORD). This article discusses ammunition and explosives management from global to state levels and
examines risk reduction in this setting, building on the experience of the Ammunition Management
Advisory Team (AMAT) response mechanism—a joint initiative of the GICHD and the UN Office of
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) since 2019.
In the past decade, states around the world have become aware of

and made publicly available in 2011 to assist states in addressing

2

the safety and security risks associated with explosive ordnance (EO)

inherent risks stemming from stockpiling ammunition accord-

and the consequences associated with poor management practices.

ing to their capacity and available material, financial, and technical

Today, an increasing number of states are ready to discuss the sensitive

resources. The IATG contain an integrated risk management system,

topic of risks associated with their stockpiled EO and seek technical

providing concrete guidance to technical and policy practitioners on

assistance toward reducing those risks.

risk-management principles and processes, as well as procedures to

Implementing a risk management system is vital for any state

guide risk-based decision-making in ammunition management.

holding EO, from the early stages of procurement through to the

Alongside these guidelines, states and organizations specializing in

stockpiling, use, and disposal of those munitions. As such, a good

ammunition through-life management are also known as the “ammu-

risk management system extends to the entire life cycle of EO and

nition management community of practice.” This article builds on the

is integrated within the framework of national regulations and

experience of the AMAT, a joint initiative established in 2019 by the

procedures. It is comprehensive and effective but not necessarily

GICHD and UNODA, to assist states in enhancing ammunition safety

resource-intensive nor technically difficult to implement.

and security by managing risks from EO as per the IATG.

The global frame of reference for managing ammunition, the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG), was developed

Global Attention to Ammunition and Explosives Risks
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The safety and security risks pertinent to conventional ammunition

and, less visibly, national debates. 3 Direct testimony of this are the two

management have captured the attention of states’ arms-control bod-

Groups of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Ammunition established

ies as well as humanitarian and development circles. Connecting dots

by the United Nations General Assembly. Established in 2008, the first

between these risks and sustainable development goals (SDGs) at the

group looked at technical aspects of ammunition stockpile manage-

policy level, this topic has taken center stage in international, regional,

ment. The work of the GGE resulted in the development of the IATG,
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In the long run, for a state to maintain safe and secure ammunition and
explosives stockpiles, the risk management process must guide the
development and implementation of a national strategy and standards,
as well as advise the competent authority and dedicated work force.14
and gave birth to the United Nations SaferGuard Programme to main-

management (PSSM). Over the past decade, a handful of international,

tain, update, and disseminate the guidelines.4 The second ammunition

regional, and nongovernmental organizations further developed their

GGE commenced its work in 2020 and is scheduled to hold its third

capabilities and became heavily invested in direct assistance to states

and final session in September 2021. The second GGE’s recommenda-

in ammunition management.5

tions, which will address challenges pertaining to through-life man-

In addition to bilateral assistance, states in need of assistance are

agement and security issues across the ammunition supply chain, will

also submitting their requests through sub-regional, regional, and

be presented to the UN General Assembly for consideration later in

international channels. In 2020 alone, ten states submitted requests

the fall of 2021.

for assistance with ammunition management to the United Nations in

As discussions continue towards safer and more secure ammuni-

their national reports on their implementation of the UN Programme

tion stockpiles, states’ demands for technical and financial assistance

of Action (PoA) on Small Arms and Light Weapons.6 Meanwhile, in

have been on the rise. In the past, a small group of states provided

the midst of the global COVID-19 pandemic and associated, compet-

assistance that was largely a bilateral affair between the donor and

ing national priorities, five states requested assistance from AMAT

recipient states’ militaries, comprising training of personnel in ammu-

with their stockpiled ammunition.

nition depots, and technical advice in physical security and stockpile

Lessons Learned
Whenever inherent risks are not properly addressed, stockpiled

Too often, post-explosion investigations report how an accident

EO pose two distinct threats to local communities, armed forces, the

could have been easily avoided and its impact minimized, if risks

economy, and society at large: the risk of accidental explosions and the

inherent to EO had been better understood, appreciated, and man-

risk of diversion. Mass explosions can result in people killed, injured,

aged. Hence, risk management should be perceived by states as a fun-

or displaced, and have significant socioeconomic consequences.

damental measure to prevent accidental explosions, unauthorized

Additionally, diversion of EO from stockpiles—in-transit and during

access, and diversion.12

transfer—leads to unchecked proliferation, which has proven to be a

Effective risk management within this context is a joint undertak-

catalyst for conflict and a contributing factor to the escalation of armed

ing by technical and policy practitioners: a process initiated with a

violence in several regions of the world.7 Diverted EO has further been

state understanding the nature of the risks involved, appreciating

systematically used to assemble improvised explosive devices (IEDs).8

their magnitude in the surrounding environment and communities,

The latest available data confirms the gravity and persistence of

and anticipating their consequences if materialized.13 Sound techni-

safety and security risks arising from ineffective stockpile manage-

cal knowledge of EO as well as good management practices should

ment: the Small Arms Survey (SAS) recorded 242 unplanned explo-

be required from the outset. In the long run, for a state to maintain

sions at munition sites (UEMS) over the 2010–2019 period, of which

safe and secure ammunition and explosives stockpiles, the risk man-

39 took place in Africa, 16 in the Americas, 116 in Asia, 70 in Europe,

agement process must guide the development and implementation

and 1 in Oceania.9 Similarly since 2011, Conflict Armament Research

of a national strategy and standards, as well as advise the competent

(CAR) has documented approximately 7,500 cases of ammunition

authority and dedicated work force.14

diversion. Furthermore, in 2018 alone, IEDs used by non-state actors
10

were responsible for 9,366 civilian casualties in forty-nine countries.11

Managing Risks, Mitigating Threats
While risks inherent from stockpiling EO cannot be entirely elimi-

are strong in practical risk management15 and structured around

nated, the likelihood of an accident can be reduced to as low as reason-

gradual improvements considering the diversity of states’ capacities

ably practical, and its effects can be mitigated. Similarly, the likelihood

and available material, financial, and technical resources.16 Modules

of diversion can be reduced to near zero. Across its modules, the IATG

use three levels of gradual ascending compliance, also known as
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risk reduction process levels (RRPLs): basic (RRPL1), intermediate

Start

(RRPL2), and advanced (RRPL3). All states, regardless of their risk
baseline and financial and technical capacities, can assess and improve

Deﬁnition of intended
use and reasonably
foreseen misuse

At a minimum, states should aim to maintain processes related to
stockpiles at RRPL1. This implies the adoption of low-cost actions that
do not often require extensive technical and material capabilities, and
can be easily implemented to improve the safety and security of EO. For example, the guidance to achieving RRPL1
entails storing weapons and ammunition separately, segre-

Risk reduction

Hazard identiﬁcation

gating certain ammunition types from others in storage and
transport, regularly ventilating explosives store houses, and removing

Risk estimation

vegetation around them.
Forward-planning is important. When more resources become

RISK ASSESSMENT

marks to work toward.

RISK ANALYSIS

management processes based on the IATG, using the RRPLs as bench-

available, a state can upgrade its storage facilities, transport infra-

Risk evaluation

structure and surveillance processes, and fill the deficit in qualified
ammunition personnel—gradually advancing to RRPL2 and RRPL3.
Acquiring knowledge (e.g., through staff training) and applying the
IATG (i.e., risk management principles and processes) will enable a
state to identify specific challenges, capabilities, and gaps. Moreover,
communicating these in appropriate national, sub-regional, and
regional forums may bring expert advice and services to the state

NO

Is tolerable risk
achieved?

from other states and specialized actors. By using the IATG and services made available, a state can establish realistic and sustainable
action plans and/or a strategy toward closing the gaps and commencing its implementation.
Image 1. Iterative risk-reduction process in the IATG.
All graphics courtesy of GICHD.

YES

Stop

Risk Reduction in Select States
Significant differences in states’ subject knowledge and management practices continue to be observed; however, a growing number

conduct risk assessments of ammunition storage facilities.

of countries seek international assistance, communicating chal-

Mauritania. In response to a request from the

lenges and capability gaps. Some also prioritize risks with aging,

Republic of Mauritania for technical assistance in late

unstable, and obsolete ammunition stockpiles—proactively plan-

2020, AMAT carried out a preliminary assessment
mission in support of the Programme National de Déminage

ning for risk reduction.
Peru. Peru was the first country to approach UNODA

Humanitaire et de Développement20 (PNDHD). Through this assess-

for assistance from AMAT. As part of the process for

ment, AMAT visited eleven storage areas, identifying capabilities,

their Institutional Transformation (2020–2034) plan,

risks, and needs in weapons and ammunition management. The

Peru is taking its first steps in aligning its policies and practices with

assessments were conducted against the baselines from the IATG and

the IATG. After delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic travel

the Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium

restrictions and lockdowns, AMAT is now able to assist Peru with its

(MOSAIC). Following the mission, short- and longer-term recom-

ongoing efforts. Currently, nearly seventy war materiel army officers

mendations were submitted to the PNDHD, aimed at gradually

have been trained on the IATG,18 and deployed in-country in various

improving safety and security management. Pending relaxation of

management and regulatory functions.

COVID-19 travel restrictions, AMAT’s plans with Mauritania include

19

With technical assistance

from AMAT, Peru plans to update and streamline the regulatory

104

partnership with the Spanish Ministry of Defence and AMAT, will

a follow-up mission to implement recommendations.

framework between branches of the military into a set of national stan-

Moldova. For nearly two decades, the Ministry of

dards for ammunition management, as stipulated by national legisla-

Defense of Moldova, with support from the interna-

tion. These multi-year activities with key ministries and armed forces

tional community, has implemented a program to

will be accompanied by further training. Additionally, Peru, in

secure and make safe its ammunition stockpiles largely inherited
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following the fall of the Soviet Union.21
Significant steps have been taken to make the
management more systems-based, effective,
and responsive to risks. This has included
bringing ammunition-related policies and
practices in line with IATG practices. For
example, Moldova has gradually reduced the
number of ammunition storage locations from
eighteen to five, involving surveillance, transport, and disposal of dysfunctional, unsafe, and
surplus ammunition.22 Yet, aware of the magnitude of the remaining challenge, the Ministry of
Defense requested in 2020 that AMAT review
the PSSM program’s progress as well as
Moldova’s National Army Action Plan 2020–
2024. In response, AMAT visited Moldova’s
ammunition facilities in October 2020 and, in

Image 2. Delivery of a virtual training course on the IATG to the Peruvian Army.

May 2021, convened a technical workshop for Moldovan experts in

Guinea requested technical assistance from UNODA’s Regional Centre

Geneva in July 2021, raising government awareness on ammunition

for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, which resulted in UNODA acti-

through-life management and effective safety and security risk reduc-

vating the quick response mechanism of the UN SaferGuard

tion measures.

Programme. Within three days of the request, AMAT deployed and

Equatorial Guinea. In March 2021, a series of explo-

tasked an expert team to Bata to assist in determining the cause of the

sions rocked the city of Bata, Equatorial Guinea, result-

incident; identifying further explosion risks through a rapid risk

ing in more than 100 deaths and 600 injured. The

assessment on the ground; assisting in reducing the risk of further

explosions annihilated the military camp housing the storage facilities

explosion incidents through technical advice on risk-mitigation mea-

in which the explosions originated and destroyed more than 200 build-

sures; and providing technical support recommendations to the

ings in the surrounding areas. Following the explosion, Equatorial

United Nations in light of the coordinated bilateral offers of assistance
from other states and organizations. During and after the mission, the
team made next-step recommendations, which the government of
Equatorial Guinea approved. These included a training program in EO
safety and security; a new design and relocation of storage areas away
from populations; and development of national standards and legislation for EO management.
Of these examples, Peru, Mauritania, and Moldova manifest a proactive approach to risk reduction. While each country has differing
capabilities, the challenges, baselines, and inherent risks from EO
are the same across countries. Such proactive approaches to reducing risks in states are important, especially when comparing the costs
of maintaining an effective ammunition through-life management
system. This is exemplified by the devastating series of explosions in

Image 3. Meeting between AMAT and the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Moldova.

Equatorial Guinea where, besides the tragic loss of life, the estimated
cost for recovery runs in to the hundreds of millions USD.24

Difficult but Passable Road Ahead
In contrast to earlier observations of positive change vis-à-vis states’

have access to the IATG and may seek assistance from the commu-

efforts to reduce risks, and despite the availability of the IATG, the

nity of practice, e.g., UN SaferGuard Programme, regional organiza-

root causes of the recent, avoidable humanitarian disasters bear wit-

tions, other states, or through a dedicated response mechanism such

ness to the under-appreciation of the safety risks associated with EO—

as AMAT.25 Additionally, states may take advantage of financial assis-

both military ammunition and commercial explosives. Lack of action

tance mechanisms and trust funds through which technical assistance

by authorities is often explained as an absence of advanced technical

can also be channeled.26 For many states, the road to progressive and

knowledge and insufficient financial resources. However, all states

sustained risk reduction is long and winding but passable.
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Image 4. AMAT expert (right) and United Nations Disaster
Assessment and Coordination CBRNE23 specialist conducting
post-explosion investigation at the blast site in Bata.

Conclusion
The importance of recognizing the inherent risks posed by stock-

into a state authority’s logistics management processes, proactive risk

piled EO and the potential consequences stemming from inadequate

reduction prevents UEMS and diversion—saving lives and property.

reduction of such risks cannot be understated, marking a state’s first

It instills security, accountability, and even slows degradation of stock

step in questioning the adequacy of its policies and standards for

while lessening the impact of risks materialized—human, material,

conduct. The IATG’s RRPLs offer milestones to work toward, gradu-

financial, political, environmental, or reputational. Among other

ally bringing the different components of EO management in line

mechanisms for assistance, AMAT and its partners stand ready to sup-

with international good practice. When performed well, through-life

port states with their stocks of EO, ensuring that they are safe, secure,

management of EO is a costly affair; yet implementing a system for

and fit-for-purpose.
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